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IWS Issue Briefs 
The Good, the Bad, and Wal-Mart 
 
What’s good for business is good for America. Or so the maxim goes. First asserted 50 
years ago by the chair of General Motors Corp. in reference to the relationship between 
his company and his country, the sentiment has since come to exemplify and rationalize 
all manner of private sector strategies, policies, decisions, and actions. Federal, state, and 
local governments, to a large extent, likewise regard this “truth” as self-evident.   
 
Today, the nation’s largest company and number one employer would have Americans 
believe that its interests are synonymous with the public interest. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a 
retailing behemoth with more than 3,700 locations in the U.S., 1.2 million employees, 
and annual domestic sales of $228 billion (representing a measurable chunk of 
Americans’ overall spending) stands as consumers’ best friend. With unparalleled 
purchasing power and marketplace heft, Wal-Mart prides itself on driving down costs all 
the way through the smallest supplier to ensure the lowest prices on everything from 
electronics to clothing to house wares to edibles. Wal-Mart also takes credit for 
stimulating economic development, creating jobs, and filling local coffers with sales and 
property tax revenues through decisions to locate stores in rural communities, small cities 
and suburbs, and struggling urban neighborhoods. 
 
But there’s a contrary view gaining currency across the land; that is, what’s good for 
Wal-Mart is bad for America. Skepticism about Wal-Mart ranges from concern about low 
wages and suspect workplace practices to perceived threats to the ongoing viability of 
communities’ social and economic infrastructure once the big box store comes to town. 
The doubts don’t end with Wal-Mart but extend to larger questions about changes 
rippling through the American economy and general anxiety about the nation’s dwindling 
manufacturing base, the disappearance of solid middle-class jobs, and the growing gap 
between the have’s and have-not’s. The giant retailer is often the target of critics’ ire 
because it is such a stark and overpowering symbol of the emerging economic order.  Its 
founder, Sam Walton, understood perfectly how the system works, and to this day 
company executives continue to prove their proficiency in carrying out his vision. 
 
Wal-Mart’s rapid and aggressive expansion has proceeded largely unimpeded since its 
founding in Rogers, AK more than 40 years ago. That seemingly unstoppable momentum 
has finally hit a bump. A loose coalition of labor unions, community activists, small 
business owners, environmentalists, religious leaders, and even some politicians are 
throwing down obstacles. They are challenging Wal-Mart’s presumptions as well as its 
plans – and getting a measure of help from disgruntled employees who have filed suits 
against the company alleging a variety of illegal workplace conduct.    
 
Few would dispute that Wal-Mart is a model 21st century multi-national corporation. It 
boasts more than 1,500 stores in nine countries besides the U.S., buys goods produced in 
less developed economies, and in many ways is a paragon of the new service economy. 
Retail analysts marvel at its prowess in harnessing technology for inventory control and 
distribution, in pressing suppliers to slash costs, in identifying what consumers want and 
how much they are willing to pay, and in maximally using its human resources. The 
retailer holds managers to strict cost and profitability standards and expects maximum 
input and output from employees, called “associates” in company parlance, at all times. 
In other words, Wal-Mart flexes its internal muscles to sustain the market dominance that 
enables its target customers (low- and middle-income shoppers) to stretch their hard-
earned dollars.  
 
The flip side of the Wal-Mart phenomenon is less exalting. The real cost of the low prices 
is borne, in part, by low-wage sales clerks and cashiers, stockroom personnel and 
assistant managers and by production workers toiling in the far corners of the world 
whose output winds up on Wal-Mart shelves. The burden is felt by employees of rival 
retailers and allied industries whose wages and benefits flag under the weight of Wal-
Mart’s presence. It is carried by independent neighborhood merchants who cannot beat 
the price advantage that accrues to a competitor with colossal market power. And finally, 
it bears down on the environment through the sprawl that often follows in Wal-Mart’s 
wake, with its spur to construction and commercial activity on the fringe of established 
communities and what critics characterize as its negative impact on the local ecosystem 
and traffic and housing patterns.  
 
Wal-Mart’s policies and practices in the workplace have drawn particularly strong 
condemnation. Although Wal-Mart portrays itself as a stand-up employer, offering 
competitive wages, a benefits package that reflects caring support, and a “family 
business” environment that fosters commitment to “our people,” critics contend just the 
opposite. The negative view of the company holds that workers earn poverty level wages, 
that health insurance and other benefits are inadequate, that workplace control is 
excessively authoritarian, that workers’ personal well-being is often discounted, that 
labor laws are sometimes flouted, and that high turnover indicates deep dissatisfaction 
within the ranks.  
 
Consider wages and benefits. Hourly pay at Wal-Mart averages less than $10; for a full-
time employee putting in 40-hour weeks this translates into an annual income slightly 
above the national poverty level of $18,850 for a family of four. On the benefits side, the 
company contributes 4% of workers’ eligible pay into a profit sharing/401(k) plan, pays 
bonuses, and offers health insurance. But the cost of participating in the latter is so high 
relative to wages – approximately $40 a month for an individual and $155 a month for a 
family – that only 40% of the workforce opts to buy in. The remaining 60% either carry 
no health insurance at all, piggy-back on to the plan of a spouse or partner, or rely on 
government-sponsored (i.e., taxpayer-subsidized) programs such as Medicaid. One study 
cited by The Washington Post on its Web site late last year found that Wal-Mart 
employees comprised a plurality of Medicaid recipients in Las Vegas. The UC Berkeley 
Labor Center reported in 2004 that 23% fewer Wal-Mart workers were covered by their 
company’s health insurance plan than workers in large retail operations as a whole and 
that Wal-Mart employees earned, on average, an estimated 31% less. The Labor Center 
also found that Wal-Mart workers in California were heavy users of the state’s public 
assistance programs, to the tune of $86 million a year. As it does so efficiently with 
suppliers, company critics argue, Wal-Mart squeezes labor costs out of its own system by 
pushing them on to other entities. 
 
Unions are another hot button topic among Wal-Mart bashers. Even with its expedient 
acceptance last November of the state-sponsored All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
as the representative of 20,000 workers at 40 Wal-Mart stores in that country, the retailer 
is regarded as fiercely anti-union everywhere else. Corporate spokespeople deny Wal-
Mart disapproves of organized labor and disingenuously note that many customers are 
union members and many employees are former union members. Nonetheless, the 
company insists that unions would not add value in the workplace and would interfere 
with its ability to connect directly with employees. Its Web site proclaims: 
 
At Wal-Mart, we respect the individual rights of our associates and encourage 
them to express their ideas, comments and concerns. Because we believe in 
maintaining an environment of open communications, we do not believe there is a 
need for third-party representation. 
 
That message has been heard loudly and clearly by employees and unions alike. The 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) has maintained low-level organizing 
campaigns at a number of Wal-Mart stores over the past few years although the return on 
its efforts is negligible. The union successfully fought a nationwide injunction against 
soliciting Wal-Mart employees that was issued in 2002 by a state court in Arkansas but 
has lost representation elections among tire and lubrication workers at several stores, 
most recently in New Castle, PA and Loveland, CO. It boasted a Pyrrhic victory in 2000 
among a small group of butchers in Jacksonville, Texas and the surface appearance of 
collective bargaining at a store in Jonquiere, Quebec, whose employees embraced the 
UFCW in August, 2004. The union took a drubbing during a four-month strike in late 
2003 by workers at three grocery chains in southern California that were nervous about 
the planned expansion of Wal-Mart supercenters (which sell grocery items) and held out 
until the UFCW agreed to a package of lower wages and benefits for new hires.  
 
One plausible explanation for the UFCW’s dispiriting record: Wal-Mart shifts into 
overdrive to ensure that organized labor does not penetrate its operations. The company 
quashed the butchers’ aspirations just one month after the pro-union vote by switching to 
pre-packaged meat and eliminating the jobs of in-store butchers. In the midst of stalled 
contract negotiations in Jonquiere, Wal-Mart announced it would close the store, saying 
the outlet was not meeting financial targets and ongoing labor problems had made the 
situation worse. According to reports in The New York Times, workers at another 
recently-organized store in Quebec are now worried their jobs will disappear as well. 
Current and former employees have stated publicly that union organizing efforts are 
swiftly met by a posse of consultants from corporate headquarters who teach managers 
how to thwart the union. Managers and supervisors jump into the fray by calling 
mandatory meetings and showing videos that disparage unions, privately interviewing 
alleged union sympathizers and firing some, implying the store could close, and hiring 
new workers just before an election who are sure to vote against the union. The intensity 
of management’s response, which in some cases involves outright intimidation, 
invariably destroys the union campaign.  
 
Bowed but undeterred, the labor movement recently decided to switch tactics. Instead of 
putting its money and energy into organizing, it will focus on publicizing the company’s 
labor practices and dissuading union members from shopping at Wal-Mart. The goal is to 
raise awareness among the public and then transform that understanding into pressure on 
the company to boost wages, improve benefits, and otherwise repair its employment 
relations.  
 
Indeed, Wal-Mart’s workplace practices have come under a fair amount of public and 
legal scrutiny over the past few years. Between 1998 and 2003, frustrated union activists 
filed 45 unfair labor practice complaints with the National Labor Relations Board, 
alleging Wal-Mart illegally fired, harassed, and otherwise violated collective bargaining 
law during union campaigns. Wal-Mart has also run afoul of federal labor and 
immigration laws for, among other things, contracting out cleaning services to companies 
that hired illegal immigrants (the company recently agreed to an $11 million settlement 
with the U.S. Department of Labor but still faces a civil suit filed by the workers), 
locking in some overnight workers, not paying overtime to workers who were forced to 
work off-the-clock, and violating child labor laws by allowing minors to use hazardous 
equipment or scheduling them to work excessive hours. An internal audit completed in 
2004 found almost 1,400 problems involving minors in 128 stores; Wal-Mart recently 
settled outstanding complaints involving young workers at stores in Connecticut, New 
Hampshire, and Arkansas and did so with Maine in 2000. The company is now fighting a 
class action suit involving 1.6 million current and former female Wal-Mart employees 
that stems from a suit filed in 2000 by six women in San Francisco who alleged sex 
discrimination in pay, promotions, and work assignments.  
 
The backlash against Wal-Mart often extends beyond workplace concerns, especially 
now that the company is poised to invade the urban frontier. Voters in Inglewood, 
California last year rebuffed Wal-Mart’s plan to build a store in that community. A loud 
outcry by a coalition of community and labor activists, merchants, politicians, and 
religious leaders in New York City convinced a developer to drop Wal-Mart from a 
proposed shopping complex in Queens. In Chicago as well, criticism of the company’s 
practices and policies pushed the City Council to reject a store on the south side while 
cautiously approving a store on the west side, where community leaders extracted a 
pledge from the retailer that they could be involved in some hiring decisions and that 
certain items would be supplied by local providers.  
 
Is Wal-Mart perhaps a bit humbled by such incidents? Wal-Mart did fire several 
executives in late 2004 who had been involved with the questionable labor practices and 
it is waging a public relations campaign intended to burnish its image. But the longer-
term effect on company policies and procedures is impossible to predict. Given Wal-
Mart’s relentless march towards ubiquity, shoppers as workers as citizens can only hope 
company executives are mindful of the impact their decisions have on the social and 
economic well-being of communities large and small. Meanwhile, those shoppers as 
workers as citizens might consider how and why the system got so out of whack to begin 
with.  
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